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In the following I will briefly give you an overview over the issues discussed in Panel II which was dedicated to
“Concerns” from the Italian perspective, presented from a German and an Italian point of view with regard to
decision 238 of the Italian Constitutional Court. This topic raised very concrete and difficult aspects because as a
consequence of decision 238 Italian tribunals have now to decide on the merits of reparation claims which until
then were peacefully sleeping under the veil of jurisdictional immunity.
I will come to this in a moment after having made two preliminary remarks.
Firstly: Nobody will really be surprised that the assessment if decision 238 viewed from the Italian and the
German perspective does not differ essentially. This is due to the fact that we had two very renown international
lawyers, namely Prof. Heike Krieger and Prof. Paolo Palchetti, who assessed the international law perspective
free from any political bias and thus demonstrated that the law in force governing the questions at stake is clear,
but that discussions concerning new developments of the law on immunity do have merit, although they are still
situated in the context of lex ferenda and that therefore flexibility in looking for a solution is welcome.
The second remark has particular relevance with regard to the fact that the Italian judiciary was highly interested
in pushing forward acceptance for the idea that the customary law on state immunity has changed or is on the
point of doing so. The formation of customary international law requires constant general state practice and
opinion juris, meaning that the great majority of states acts as they do because they regard this as a legal
obligation. In this context the fact is highly relevant – as both speakers underlined – that there is no “Italian”
reaction to decision 238, expressing a uniform position of the Italian State, but that the reaction of state organs,
in particular the judiciary and the executive, differ. This difference existed already when the dispute was brought
before the ICJ (International Court of Justice) and concerned the determination of the customary international
law on state immunity and the general position of human rights in international law. The reaction of the Italian
executive and legislator to the ICJ judgment then seemed to put an end to the differences, what was, however,
contradicted by the judiciary, by the Constitutional Court, in its decision 238. That decision blocked the
implementation of the ICJ judgment and undermined a uniform Italian practice thus being rather contra-
productive when it comes to the emergence of new customary law. I need not repeat the details, they are well
known and are the reason for this interesting meeting in this wonderful place.
It is however interesting to note that even after the decision of the Constitutional Court Italy did not speak with
“one voice”: The executive, the Consiglio dei Ministri, did in fact continue to support the invocation of immunity by
Germany in cases concerning reparation requests and thus acted in conformity with the ICJ judgment; the
tribunals, on the other side, could no longer dismiss such cases, but nevertheless showed some reluctance to
cope with the judgment of the Constitutional Court. The first of these cases contain rather detailed justifications
for the disregard of immunity of Germany and also the merits of the cases led to quite different outcomes.
I may perhaps add already at this place that the general feeling in Panel II was that the rule on jurisdictional
immunity should be retained, in particular for reasons of “reciprocity”. This aspect was brought to the point when
it was asked whether Italy in case of claims for grave violations of humanitarian law (during World War II or later)
brought against it before courts of other states would in fact refrain from invoking immunity.  This the more as not
all states are constitutional states subject to the rule of law and human rights guaranteeing a fair trial. Thus,
immunity seems indispensable at least at the time being. This conclusion was considered  to be justified
moreover by the fact that decision 238 has gained effect meanwhile also in cases not concerning Germany, but
resulting from grave violations of humanitarian law committed in recent armed conflicts which were brought
before Italian courts. Thus, a state that does not recognize jurisdictional immunity may become an attractive
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forum in such litigations. 
That  leads me to some more general consequences of decision 238 discussed in Panel II. The first one
concerns the question of the follow-up of decisions that award reparation to claimants. As it seems rather
doubtful that Germany will voluntarily pay, the issue of execution arises. In international law states are not only
immune from jurisdiction before courts of another state, but also the forced execution of judgments into property
of a state – that is not used for commercial aims –  is excluded due to immunity. Although things would be much
easier if jurisdictional immunity and immunity from execution would follow the same pattern, the opinion
prevailed that there are good reasons to maintain immunity from execution even where jurisdictional immunity
may be limited. Clear doubts were expressed as to whether the question of immunity from execution should also
be referred to the Constitutional Court, because such decision would in any case have serious consequences:
would the Court decide as it did with regard to jurisdictional immunity and deny immunity from execution for
reasons of incompatibility with the Italian constitution, the relations between Italy and Germany would severely
be affected and even a new dispute before the ICJ could become possible. But if the Constitutional Court would
uphold the rule on immunity of execution the victims would feel betrayed because decision 238 would lose any
efficiency with regard to their claims: they will have their cases decided, but such judgments will remain “dead
letter” because they cannot be executed.
This situation then raised a further point in the discussion which centered particularly on the consequences if
Italy would enact forceful execution in violating international law. The point at stake was the international
responsibility of Italy. International responsibility is incurred if a state violates its obligations vis-à-vis another
state. Whether such responsibility was already enacted by the judgment of the Constitutional Court was not met
by unanimity. It was, however, uncontested, that the judgment was in violation of international law, because even
the Constitutional Court had recognized that the rule on jurisdictional immunity reflects the existing status of law
as confirmed by the ICJ. But there was agreement that international responsibility would in any case be enacted
as soon as any act of forceful execution would be taken with regard to German property. In this case Germany
could ask for reparation which Italy would have to pay in restituting to Germany exactly the amount of money
awarded to the victims. This would lead to the strange situation that it is, in the last resort, Italy that pays
reparation to the victims, a result that was certainly not aimed at by the Constitutional Court. I have, however, to
add that the alternative of execution measures into German property was considered by Panel II rather as a
theoretical alternative – what it hopefully will remain.
This leads me finally to some more general and broader consequences of decision 238 which were mentioned in
Panel II but not discussed at length although they are of particular significance. In the first place there is the bulk
of substantial questions that now will play a role before the Italian tribunals and which have not been tackled until
now due to the existence of jurisdictional immunity. I will only mention the issues and not go into further details.
Questions such as who is a “victim”, is the family of a victim empowered to claim reparation, until what
generation: children, grand-children or even more? What about the time frame: are there any time-limits to bring
claims for acts committed more than 70 years ago? How should reparation look like: is symbolic reparation or
satisfaction enough which possibly might be seen already by reaching a judgment even if it cannot be executed?
What about problems like prescription, forfeiture, intertemporal law etc. All these are questions which are not
solved on the international level and whether Italian tribunals would like it or not: their decisions on these
questions will have relevance beyond the relation to Germany: as there will be hundreds of decisions and as in
other contexts similar questions have to be decided, the jurisprudence in Italy will serve as precedent what may
raise the question whether the solution of such far-reaching problems should rest with the judiciary of a state.
This question is even more justified as Italian tribunals will also have to take position with regard to fundamental
questions of reparation after armed conflicts that urgently need a solution – and which have arisen meanwhile
also before international courts, i.e. the ECtHR in Strasbourg. Such issues concern for example the fundamental
question whether claims arising  from armed conflict should at all be settled on an individual basis, a topic that
has severe implications for acts taken to terminate an armed conflict and restoring peace and friendly relations:
will parties to a conflict be ready to conclude peace-treaties and to agree on lump-sum reparation if individual
compensation requests are imminent? What about the huge number of possible individual claims from both
sides, the time-frame for admitting such claims and the time necessary to decide such proceedings? All these
and other  items are relevant in the dispute between Germany and Italy, but are not limited to the dispute
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between these two states and therefore are certainly not of a character to be regulated by the national (or even
international) judiciary.
This state of affairs and particularly the dead-lock reached between Germany and Italy led during the discussion
of the last two days not only Panel II to support the way out of the impasse offered by the ICJ in its meanwhile
famous obiter dictum in paragraph 104 of the decision. In this paragraph, the ICJ urged the parties, Germany
and Italy, to enter into renegotiations for solving the questions at stake – even though there is no legal obligation
to do so. Renegotiation became sort of a leitmotiv in the discussions looking for alternative solutions of the
dispute which must in the nearly unanimous appreciation be settled in the near future. Such negotiations should,
however, according to a general view, not be limited to the state level, but include also the victims.
There is no doubt that good reasons, namely legal reasons, can be induced by Germany which justify insisting
on its position what means leaving things as they are. On the other side it may be considered helpful to
overcome the shadow of the past which heavily lies on the otherwise friendly relations of both states which are in
permanent contact working together in numerous contexts. That means that the time may have come to
abandon legal reasons, legal reasoning for the sake of reasonableness. That means that a good-will approach
might be made to set a final point to the inheritance of the past, a good-will initiative that will, however, be only
successful if both States are ready to make relevant concessions as compared to their original position.     
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